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INTERNATIONAL bAiK FOR RECONSTRUCTIO1 ANiD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT AND RECOMMEi4DATION OF TiE PRESIDENT
TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED LOAN TO
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR A SECONDARY CITIES REGIONAL PROJECT
1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed
loan to the Republic of Korea for the equivalent of US$15.0 million to
nelp finance a secondary cities regional project. The loan would nave
a term of 25 years, including seven years of grace, with interest at 8 per-
cent per annum.
PART I - THE ECONOIY
2. Tne latest economic report ("Current Economic Position and Pros-
pects of the Republic of Korea") was distributed under cover of R74-42 dated
liarch 4, 1974. The report is based on the findings of an economic mission
that visited Korea in September/October 1973, and again in January 1974 to
discuss tne report in draft. Tne Country Data sheets are attached as Annex I.
3. Korea's economic record during tne last decade nas undoubtedly
been one of the most impressive among the developing countries. GNP growth
averaged 9.5 percent per annum during 1963-72 and average per capita income
during 1973, at about US$370, was in real terms more than double the level
of ten years ago. This rapid increase in per capita income was, of course,
mainly due to the large gains in output, but it was facilitated by a sharp
decline in the rate of population growth from nearly tUree percent in the
early sixties to less than two percent at present. A key element in the
rapid expansion of the Korean economy has been the growth of manufactured
goods exports from less than US$10 million in the early 1960s to US$2,843
million in 1973. klanufactured exports, wnich now provide 90 percent of
merciiandise exports, constitute about 30 percent of manufactured output.
Tne structural change in the Korean economy is nighlighted by the sharp rise
in tne ratio of manufacturing output to GNP which now stands at 27 percent
(compared to 17 percent in 1963). Under the impetus of sharply rising
manufactured goods exports, the ratio of merchandise exports to G&NP rose
steadily to 26 percent in 1973 from less than 4 percent a decade earlier.
4. The rapid growth that has transformed the Korea economy from one
characterized by dependence on agriculture and sluggish growth in the post-
Korean-war years to one of dynamic growth based on increasing industriali-
zation has not been achieved without strain. Korea began to face serious
resource management problems toward the end of the Sixties because the heavy
investment required to sustain rapid economic growth was well beyond its own
savings capability. With a sixfold growth in real investment and a rise in
the ratio of investment to GNP from 12 percent to 25 percent over the last
decade, the external resource requirements have grown very considerably.
Inspite of the remarkable increase in export earnings, the ratio of public
debt service payments to total foreign exchange receipts increased sharply
during the Sixties to reach a peak of 20.5 percent in 1971 due, in part, to
excessive reliance on suppliers' credits during 1965-70. The absolute gap
in incomes between urban and rural areas, where nearly half the population
still lives, widened until 1970 despite a massive migration to the cities.
Because of its increasing concern with these problems, the Government, in
the early Seventies, laid stress on "harmony in growth, stabilization and
a balanced economy". A deliberate effort was made to reduce the rate of
increase of investment, to increase the inflow of capital from official
sources while imposing restrictions on suppliers' credits, and to improve the
balance of payments position through substantial exchange rate adjustments.
These measures, combined with a reduction in Government real investment and
the uncertainty in the Korean business community about export prospects,
produced a marked slowdown in the economy. Even with a continued high rate
of export expansion (38 percent per annum), GNP growth averaged only 8 percent
per annum during 1970-72 compared with nearly 12 percent in the preceding
three years. Real investment stagnated during 1970-71 and the ratio of fixed
investment to GNP dropped sharply from 27 percent in 1969 to 20 percent in
1972. The general economic slowdown did not, however, result in abatement
of inflationary pressures; the consumer price index rose by almost 14 percent
in 1971. The Government, therefore, took further measures in August 1972 to
check inflation and to moderate the disruptive financial effect of the
economic slowdown on the business sector.
5. Even by Korean standards, 1973 was an exceptional year which set
new records of growth in GNP, exports and savings. Real GNP growth during
1973 was 16.9 percent due mainly to an unprecedented increase in exports and
a marked revival in fixed investment. Merchandise exports in 1973 rose by
92 percent compared to 1972. The national saving rate, which had dropped to
about 15 percent in 1972, was 21 percent in 1973, thus surpassing the previous
peak set in 1969. Even though imports recorded a 73 percent growth in 1973,
foreign savings measured by the deficit on the goods and services account
amounted to about 5 percent of GNP and were less than 20 percent of total
investment. Compared to the situation in 1968-71 when foreign savings constit-
uted 11-12 percent of GNP and financed 35-40 percent of total investment,
Korea had become much less dependent on foreign resources. Moreover, the
export expansion and the marked increase in tourism revenues reduced the debt
service ratio from 14 percent in 1972 to 10 percent in 1973.
6. The momentum from 1973 carried the economy in the first half of 1974
in which GNP in real terms grew by more than 15 percent over the comparable
period of 1973, while export earnings and industrial output in real terms
increased by 27 and 30 percent, respectively. (The comparable increases for
the first half of 1973 were 66 and 31 percent.)
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7. The large increases in the price of petroleum in late 1973 marked
the beginning of a downturn in the international economy and signalled a
significant change in Korea's short-term prospects. Export orders for the
first nine months of 1974 showed a 8-9 percent decline in real terms over a
year earlier, and the rate of decline accelerated during May-September.
8. For 1974 as a whole, exports are expected to grow about 12 percent
in real terms and about 28 percent in nominal terms. Imports are estimated
to grow only about three percent in real terms but the moninal increase
is expected to be about 60 percent. This deterioration in the commodity
terms of trade is equivalent to about $561 million, or about 44 percent of
the estimated trade gap in 1974. It is also equivalent to a loss of about
three percent of GNP in 1974.
9. The Government has moved to help those persons hardest hit by the
economic slowdown through employment-creating public works programs, tax
reductions and financial aid to small and medium industries, especially those
accumulating large inventories. The Government in January 1974 eliminated
the general exemption from customs duties available for machinery imports
for the export sector and raised the preferential interest rate on export
advances. It also acted to reduce imports by increasing taxes on luxury
imports and on a number of commodities that are produced domestically.
However, finished non-food consumer goods comprise a relatively small share
of Korea's total imports (2.2 percent in 1973) and total raw material imports
for domestic use excluding food were about 13 percent. Thus, there is little
scope for cutting down on non-essential imports.
10. Compared to an increase in total imports in real terms of only three
percent in 1974, real increases of 14 and 13 percent, respectively, are
forecast for crude oil and raw materials for export. Imports other than oil
and raw materials will decline in real terms by three percent.
11. Korea's dependence on imported fuels is not only extremely heavy
but is linked to essential industrial and transportation uses. The passenger
vehicle fleet is small with only one private passenger vehicle per 152
families. Nonetheless, to reduce demand for petroleum products, tax rates,
including tariffs on private cars and petroleum products, were raised
substantially.
12. The official estimate of the current account deficit for 1974 is
$1,360 million. Including about $290 million which is required for the re-
payment of external debt, the total external resource needs in 1974 are
about $1,650 million. Of this amount, about $900 million is expected to be
covered from official sources, suppliers credits, direct private investment
and direct loans to the private sector. Drawings on the IMF gold tranche
and use of the oil facility are expected to provide an additional $144
million. Korea has used $24 million of the gold tranche with the IMF and
$108 million of the oil facility. The last $12.0 million of the oil facility
is expected to be drawn by the end of the year.
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13. The remainder of the gap, about $750 million, will have to be met by
the inducement of additional long-term funds, to the extent possible, and
from short-term borrowings through the banking system that will draw down net
foreign exchange reserves. Such reserves stood at about $1 billion at the
beginning of 1974 but are expected to have declined to about $100 million by
December 31.
14. Although Korea appears to face a current account deficit in 1975
as large as in 1974, the present economic problems are viewed by the Government
as being essentially short-term in nature. An upturn in the economies of
Korea's principal trading partners, Japan and U.S., and in international trade
is anticipated in the latter half of 1975. The strategy being followed is to
minimize the adverse effects on the productive capacity of the manufacturing
sector during the current period of slack demand so that when international
economic momentum picks up the Korean export sector will be able to respond.
15. On December 7, 1974, the Government took steps to intensify its
export promotion activities, stimulate production and maintain employment.
The exchange rate was changed from Won 400 to Won 485 per US$. Export
credits for imported raw materials and domestic goods were increased. Prices
of petroleum products and electricity (except for households) and railway
rates were raised between 31 and 42 percent. In the future, Government approval
must be obtained for price increases for 58 selected basic items. The interest
rate on time deposits has been increased to stimulate savings, and the bulk
of Government investment for 1975 will be undertaken in the first six months
of the year to promote employment and offset the slack in the economy.
Special credits have been instituted to stimulate private investment and addi-
tional financial assistance is being provided to small and medium businesses.
About 330,000 new public jobs are being created and preference in hiring is
being given to persons in the lower income group. About 87,000 new housing
units are to be constructed in 1975 through public programs in addition to
the 112,000 originally planned.
16. Korea's ability to obtain foreign funds on the scale required will
be a main determinant of whether or not it will be able to adjust to the
higher cost of petroleum and other essential imports without a substantial
reduction in GNP growth. Some quick-disbursing program aid will be needed
in the next year or so in addition to normal project lending if the required
amounts are to be available. Servicing additional debt of the magnitude
envisaged is not likely to be a serious problem, provided a substantial
proportion of external loans is provided by official sources and the terms of
loans from private sources are not unduly onerous. On the assumption that
about one-third of external loans are from official sources, and that the
average maturity of these loans is not less than ten years, the debt service
ratio would rise only from 10 percent in 1973 to 14 percent by 1979. But
the need for continuous attention to the structure of total debt will remain.
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17. The Government is intensifying its efforts to prepare projects
suitable for external official financing in the fields of infrastru:ture,
agriculture and regional development. The foreign exchange component of
such projects is low, partly because they consist largely of civil t,orks,
and Korea's construction industry is efficient and well organized &ad wins
an overwhelming proportion of contracts put out to international competition.
Moreover, the construction industry's dependence on imports is expe,:ted to
lessen in the future. Korea's need for official aid therefore cannot be
met if financing is confined to the foreign exchange costs of proje:ts. For
this reason the Bank should continue to be prepared to finance, in appropriate
cases, a portion of local costs.
18. The details of Korea's present econondc situation and it's near
term prospects will be examined by an economic mission that is scheduled
for January 1975.
PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN KOREA
19. As of October 31, 1974, Korea had received 15 Bank loans znd 8 IDA
credits, amounting in total to $502.2 million in loans and US$107 million
in credits (taking into account cancellations and the refinancing o;- one
IDA credit in a subsequent Bank loan),
20. About one-half of the total has been for the transport sector -
$119.7 million for railways, $101.5 million for highways and US$80 million
for ports. $130.5 million has gone to agricultural projects - US$91 million
for irrigation projects, $7 million for livestock development, US$10.5 mil-
lion for the provision of medium- and long-term credit tlhrough the Ilational
Agriculture Corporation Federation (NACF), $7 million for seeds procluction
and US$13.0 million for an integrated agricultural products processv.ng pro-
ject. The Korean Development Finance Corporation (KDFC) has received US$95
million in Bank loans for relending to private industry. The balani:e of
US$82.8 million was for two education projects and a tourism project:.
21. IFC has made four investments in Korea and its commitment:; amount
to $3.4 million in loans and shares. 1/ It made its first equity inivestment
in KDFC, of $0.7 million or 14 percent of KDFC's paid-in capital, a': the time
the Bank made its first loan to KDFC. A loan of $1.4 million to, and an
equity investment of US$0.3 million in, the Honam Silk Co. was made in 1969.
In 1971, IFC purchased $0.6 million of the shares of the Korea Investment
and Finance Corporatior. - an institution whose function is to assist in the
development of the capital and money markets. In July 1973, the IFC exercised
preemptive rights and purchased at par about US$335,000 equivalent of KDFC's
common stock. In June 1974, IFC approved an investment of $17.6 mi:Llion in
the Gold Star Company Ltd. consisting of a loan of $16.0 million andl $1.6
million in equity. Gold Star is a leading electronics manufacturer IFC is
considering investments of $9 million in Tong Yang Nylon Co., Ltd., about
, A fifth investment in the Atlas Paper Co. amounting to $5 mill:Lon was
cauicelled at the request of the Company.
-6-
$3.4 million in Hae Un Dae Development Co., Ltd. for hotel development and
about $5.6 million in Korea Securities Finance Corporation.
22. Of total Bank and IDA lending, about $325.8 million remained un-
disbursed as at October 31, 1974. Annex II contains a summary statement
of Bank loans, IDA credits, and IFC investments as at October 31, 1974 and
notes on the execution of ongoing projects. As indicated in the notes,
progress on project implementation is generally satisfactory, although diffi-
culties have been encountered with some projects and most seriously with the
Pyongtaek-Kumgang and Yong San Gang Irrigation Projects (Loan 600-KO and
Loan 795/Credit 283, respectively).
23. The Bank's program for FY75 includes five projects in addition to the
proposed secondary cities regional project: a fifth loan to the Korea Develop-
ment Finance Corporation, a first loan to the Korea Development Bank, a third
education loan, and a fifth railway loan. All of these, except the fifth KDFC
loan have been appraised. Because of the need for quick disbursing program
aid referred to in paragraph 16 above, a program loan will be submitted for
consideration by the Executive Director in the first quarter of 1975.
24. The continuing emphasis on agricultural and rural development will
be reflected in the programs for the succeeding years FY76 and FY77. The
report of the agriculture sector mission (R73-287, dated December 19, 1973) has
provided the basis for developing additional high priority agricultural pro-
jects. A second livestock project, the second stage of the Yong San Gang
Irrigation Project, the Okseo irrigation and regional development project and
the Miho Cheon and Naeseong-Cheon watershed development projects have already
been identified and are under preparation, and follow-on projects in agricul-
tural credit, livestock and agricultural products processing are also being
considered. A possible forestry project has also been identified but problems
in project preparation have been encountered which will have to be resolved
if the project is to be proceeded with.
25. Another major emphasis in Korea's plans is the development of heavy
and chemical industries. Hitherto, the Bank's lending for industry to Korea
has been solely through the KDFC. As indicated, a loan for industrial
development through a second financial intermediary, the Korea Development
Bank (KDB) - a Government-owned institution responsible for the largest share
of term lending for industry in Korea, has already been appraised. Also being
considered is a loan to the Medium Industry Bank which provides financing
to smaller businesses.
26. The development of the industrial and agricultural sectors and
of exports will require concurrent infrastructural development. Although
the transport sector will be given less emphasis than in the past, the
investments required are large and, thus, there is considerable financing
for this sector in the proposed program.
27. The share of the Bank Group in Korea's total external debt disbursed
and outstanding at the end of 1973 was 6.4 percent, and the share in the
total debt service was 3.0 percent in the same period. If the Bank Group
lends on average $240 million annually, its share in total external public
debt outstanding is likely to increase to about 11 percent by the end of 1979
and the debt service due on Bank Group loans will represent about 7 percent
of total debt service payments.
28. The Consultative Group continues to be active. Bilateral assistance
to Korea increased from $71 million in 1966 to $366 million in 1973. The
U.S. and Japan continue to be the principal donors having provided more than
90 percent of the total bilateral assistance of $1,625 million during the
1966-73 period.
PART III - REGIONAL PLANNING IN KOREA
29. A preponderant proportion of Korea's extremely rapid expansion of
manufacturing capacity over the last decade or so was concentrated in the
areas around Seoul-Incheon and Busan. This concentration was probably
unavoidable because of the lack of adequate infrastructure outside these two
metropolitan areas which are served by the country's two major ports. By
the end of the last decade, about 60 percent of the total industrial labor
force worked in establishments located within these two complexes. In recent
years, the Government has encouraged the location of industry in other parts
of the country, most notably Ulsan and Pohang which together employ some
20 percent of Korea's industrial workers. However, six of the country's nine
provinces account for less than a fifth of total industrial employment.
30. It is estimated that, allowing for a certain amount of underemployment
in the agricultural sector, the average urban worker (who tends to be employed
largely in manufacturing) earns about twice as much as a typical rural worker 1!.
The wage-differential has resulted in heavy migration from the rural areas to
the few urban centers around which industrial growth has been concentrated.
Thus, between 1966-70 the population of Seoul rose by 9.8 percent per annum,
that of Busan by 7.2 percent per annum and Daegu's by 6.4 percent per annum
compared to the national average increase of 1.9 percent a year. Over half
the country's total population of approximately 33 million people lives in
the three metropolitan areas. The pattern of immigration has caused a severe
strain on urban infrastructure and exacerbated the serious housing shortages
in these cities.
31. The Government is aware of the need to increase rural incomes in
order to spread the benefits of growth more widely than at present and also
to lessen the pressures on cities like Seoul and Busan resulting from heavy
immigration from the countryside. Accordingly, one of the major objectives
of its Long Term Perspective Plan (1973-81) is to remove the present urban-
rural income gap by 1981 by increasing agricultural productivity and pro-
viding more off-farm employment. The Government recognizes that the
low level of rural incomes is largely due to the limited availability of
non-farm employment opportunities. Off-farm sources provided only 17 percent
of the total income of rural households in 1972; the comparable figures for
1/ See paragraph 21 of Chapter I of the latest Economic Report.
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the Republic of China and Japan were 55 percent and 70 percent respectively.
The achievement of income parity between urban and rural households would
depend not only on an increase in agricultural productivity and a rise in the
price-level for agricultural commodities, but perhaps more importantlv on
raising off-farm employment possibilities by the decentralization of industry.
32. The location of new industry in areas other than those of high urban
concentration was one of the major issues studied in the context of the pre-
paration of the National Land Development Plan (1972-81) which was completed
in mid-1971. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assisted in the
preparation of the Plan by financing a Regional Physical Planning Study which
commenced in 1969. The country was divided into eight regions for the purposes
of the Study. During its Phase I, the existing distribution of resources
within the various regions was inventoried and alternative physical planning
schemes, involving the development of regional areas, were studied and broad
regional and urban planning guidelines developed.
33. The Study's recommendations were incorporated in the National Land
Development Plan wihich classified national land space both by region and by
land use. It established as basic objectives: (a) efficient land-use and
development (b) natural protection and conservation and (c) improvement of the
living and working environment. Within this framework it set out policies
for the location of investments in transportation, communications, urban
infrastructure, water resource development, agriculture and forestry. The
Plan stressed the importance of achieving balanced development throughout
the nation by the dispersion of industries from metropolitan areas to cities
having populations of 50,000 - 500,000 and the systematic improvement and
expansion of major social overhead capital facilities. While detailed invest-
ment plans were not formulated for each of the eight planning regions, basic
guidelines for the development of the regions and for the preparation of
detailed regional plans were established.
34. The Gwangju region, which is located in the southwest of Korea and
consists of the Jeonra Nam Province and two counties of the Jeonra Bug Prov-
ince (see Map), was selected as the first area for development in accordance
with the guidelines of the National Land Development Plan. Gwangju typifies
the situation of those regions of Korea which have not shared in the benefits
of its dynamic industrial growth. It is predominantly agricultural; 72 percent
of its work force of 2.3 million is engaged in agriculture. Gwangju's
13,000 square kilometers constitute about 13 percent of Korea's total land
area. However, most of this is mountainous and heavily forested and less than
a third of it is arable, with the result that the high population densities on
the cultivable land cause fragmentation of land ownership and limit the intro-
duction of efficient farming methods. Income levels are among the lowest in
the country; GNP per capita in 1972 was about $193, only 65 percent of the
national average of $302. The rate of growth of the region's economy was
less than half that of the country as a whole during the 1966-72 period.
Gwangju's poor economic performance has led to an out-migration of its rural
population which declined by about 6 percent during 1966-70. Roughly 85
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percent of the rural emigrants left the region, the majority for Seoul; the
remainder settled in Gwangju's four major cities - Gwangju (the administrative
capital), Mogpo, Suncheon and Yeosu - adding to their housing shortages and
burdening already inadequate facilities such as waste disposal, water supply
and transport. During the 1960s, Gwangju City doubled in size (from 228,000
to 503,000) absorbing 69 percent of the four cities' population increase; the
population of the four cities together grew from 525,000 (15 percene: of the
region's population) to 885,000 (22 percent). The Government proJects a
doubling of the urban population in the Gwangju region and a tripling of its
urban labor force by 1981.
3.5. Gwangju's economic backwardness is partly attributable to its lack
oi1 accessibility during the Sixties from the Seoul-Daejeon-Daegu-Busan
corridor, along which economic activity has been concentrated since the end
of the Korean war. This remoteness ended with the opening of the Chonju-
Butsan Highway, (financed by the Bank under Loan 769-KO, First Highway Project),
ir, August 1973, which has dramatically lowered travel time from locations
within the region to major market centers and the ports of Masan and Busan.
Rcad communications within the Gwangju region are being improved, partly under
the Bank's Second Highway Project (Loan 956-KO). The Yong San Gang Irriga-
tion Project (being financed by Loan/Credit 795/283-KO) is indicative of
the Government's effort to raise incomes in the Gwangju area by inc;-easing
agricultural productivity.
36. The Government's concern with accelerating economic growth in
Gu,angju is also manifested in the various planning guidelines which have been
formulated taking the National Land Development Plan (1972-81) as a starting
point. It is envisaged that by 1981, Gwangju's value added per capita would
rise to 80 percent of the national average (from 65 percent in 1972); that
employment in the agricultural sector would decrease from 72 percent at
present to about 50 percent and that manufacturing output would increase at
20 percent per annum.
37. One of the major targets stipulated in the planning guidelines
relates to the development of an industrial belt to be established J.n urban
areas along Gwangju's southeastern coast. Fertilizer, metals and machine
tool industries are expected to be developed in the Yeosu and Suncheori areas.
Textile and food processing plants are planned for Gwangju and Naju while
plateglass, fishery processing and plywood factories are expected to be
located in and around Mogpo. Complementary transport investments comprising
imtprovement of road communications and the expansion of the capacity of the
port facilities at Yeosu and I4ogpo, which are expected to handle seven million
tons of cargo per annum by 1981 compared to just over a million tons per year
at present, are also envisioned. Hitherto, industrial development was limited
by the lack of adequate urban infrastructure to support new manufacturing capa-
city. The shortage of financial resources and poor management capabilities
made it difficult for the cities to undertake more than piecemeal developments.
- 10 -
Urban master plans map the intended growth of the cities, but they do not
adequately take into account the requirements and resources of the urban areas,
nor do they reflect central Government investment plans. Urban investments
in the Gwangju region have been for the most part uncoordinated and sporadic.
38. The Second Phase of the UNDP Regional Planning Study scheduled for
completion in September 1975 has started the process of identifying schemes
to enhance the capacity of the region's major cities to provide their
increasing populations with basic urban amenities and productive employment.
Further, the Government believes that work on the establishment of an
institutional framework to evaluate and implement investment plans developed
as part of the ongoing Second Phase UNDP Study should commence as soon as
possible so that the investments proposed under it are not unduly delayed
or jeopardized by the lack of efficient administrative machinery. Their
implementation will also afford an excellent opportunity to make a start
in building up the institutional support which will be required in the
execution of other regional projects.
PART IV - THE PROJECT
39. An appraisal mission visited Korea in November/December 1973 and
again in March 1974. Its report (No. 546-KO) is being circulated separately.
Negotiations were held in Washington from November 1 to 8, 1974 with a
Government team lead by Mr. J. K. Park of the Economic Planning Board. A
Loan and Project Summary is attached as Annex III. The proposed project
consists of:
(a) Infrastructure comprising:
(i) housing sites and services iy the cities of Yeosu,
Mogpo and Gwangju (370,384 m );
(ii) a fishery harbo5 complex with an industrial processing
zone (215,385 m ) at Yeosu;
(iii) a city market at Suncheon (33,166 m ); and
(iv) access roads to housing sites and industrial estates
in the cities of Yeosu and Mogpo (6.61 km).
(b) Technical Assistance aimed at:
(i) assisting the establishment and operation of the
Gwangju Regional Development Unit (GRDU) at the
provincial level of government;
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(ii) strengthening regional planning in the Ministry
of Construction (MOC) at the national level of government;
(iii) providing advisory assistance for the management and
operation of the Yeosu fishery harbor complex;
(iv) developing a program of technical assistance to
improve the operation and management of water
supply systems in four cities, including the
identification of short-term improvements; and
(v) carrying out feasibility studies of selected projects
to be identified by the Second Phase of the UNDP
Regional Physical Planning Study and by other studies
undertaken by the Government.
40. The principal aims of the proposed project are the establishment
of an organizational framework for regional investment planning and develop-
ment which could be used as a model to further regional development in other
parts of Korea, and to improve working and living conditions in the urban
areas of the Gwangju region in support of Government programs to disperse
industry and to reduce migration to the already overcrowded metropolises of
Seoul and Busan. The project, therefore, focuses on the provision of: (a)
investments geared towards improving public utilities and facilities in the
four major cities of the Gwangju region and (b) technical assistance to
strengthen regional planning and its execution. The new fishery harbor com-
plex at Yeosu would represent about 49 percent of the total project cost of
US$25 million equivalent, the housing sites and services about 24 percent,
access roads about 15 percent, technical assistance about seven percent and
the city market at Suncheon about five percent.
41. Yeosu is located in the middle of Korea's south coast, adjacent to
thie East China Sea--a prime fishing area. It has a natural deep water harbor
and two existing ports. One is a cargo port handling international imports
and exports for the southeastern part of Korea, and the other is an old
multipurpose port which is badly congested by passenger, coastal shipping and
commercial fishing vessels. Presently, most of the larger fishing vessels
(over 50 gross registered tons) based in Yeosu, land the bulk of their catches
in Busan and other ports less convenient to the East China Sea than Yeosu.
Shipowners prefer to accept the expense involved in the longer trip than to
incur the long delays in unloading and the risk of damage to their vessels
at Yeosu. The project provides for the first stage construction of a new
fishery harbor complex which, when completed, would have an annual handling
capacity of about 150,000 tons of fish and marine products, compared to about
55,000 tons annual capacity of the present facility, and about 40,000 tons
of frozen fish to be landed from deep sea trawlers. Also, about 15 plants to
process fish and marine products would be located in the industrial zone
behind the new port.
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Project Implementation
42. The MOC would have overall responsibility for project implementation.
It would establish the GRDU to exercise day-to-day supervision and to coordinate
activities among the ministries and agencies involved in project execution.
The GRDU would be headed by a Project Manager whose qualifications and expe-
rience would be acceptable to the Bank. GRDU's specific responsibilities
would include:
(a) supervising and coordinating the implementation of the proposed
Project;
(b) supervising the implementation of feasibility studies, the
evaluation and monitoring of the housing sites and services
component of the proposed Project, and the supervision of
the preparation and execution of a program to utilize
more efficiently the water supply systems in the four cities;
(c) providing assistance to the Urban Project Units which are to
be established in each of the participating cities;
(d) coordinating the sectoral investment programs of the functional
ministries into an integrated plan for the region; and
(e) preparing policy recommendations concerning the formulation
of regional strategy to be submitted to the MOC, and the
Provincial Advisory Committee and the Vice Ministers'
Conference which are referred to in the next paragraph.
43. Qualified staff from MOC, other concerned ministries, the Provin-
cial Government and the participating cities would be seconded to the GRDU.
It is envisaged that by the end of the project implementation period, the
GRDU would ilave developed the capability to continue ongoing regional
planning work. Consultants to GRDU would assist the Project Manager with
project implementation, engineering and technical supervision and project
monitoring and evaluation. They would also assist GRDU in preparing a work
program which would include review of a regional planning framework,
investment programs of the various ministries, the development of a program
of self-help housing construction, the mobilization of private investment
and the development of a training program. A consultant in regional plan-
ning would be assigned to the M4OC to assist in the review of regional
development policies and provincial programs as well as in the investigation
of a program for self-help housing construction for low-income families. A
Provincial Advisory Committee would advise the Project Manager on provincial
development plans. The Vice Ministers' Conference for Economic Affairs would
be assigned the responsibility for providing policy guidance for regional
planning and development, and for inter-agency coordination. After the
completion of construction, the housing sites would be turned over to the
cities for administration and management. Urban Project Units would be
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established in the mayors' offices of each of the four cities to administer
the sale of serviced housing sites and to plan and identify future urban
projects. Upon completion of construction, the Yeosu fishery harbor complex
would be transferred to the Office of Fisheries (OOF) of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries for operation and maintenance. The OOF is respon-
sible for similar functions in Korea's other fishing ports. Suncheon City
would be responsible for the operation and maintenance of the city market.
Cost and Financing
44. Based upon the exchange rate of Won 400 to the US$ that prevailed
prior to December 7, 1974 when the Won was devalued to 485 to the US$, the
estimated total project cost is $25.0 million equivalent, with a foreign
component estimated at $12.1 million equivalent. The foreign exchange costs
of the project will not be affected by the devaluation. The local currency
costs will be higher if local prices rise as a result of the higher cost of
imports in Won terms. The Government is taking measures to moderate price
increases; thus, rises in local prices resulting from the devaluation should
be less than the amount of the devaluation. Local costs expressed in US$
will be somewhat less because of the devaluation. The financial and economic
conclusions of the appraisal which was carried out prior to the devalliation
will not be substantially altered by the new exchange rate.
45. The proposed Bank loan would meet about 60 percent of total project
cost. If Korea's competitive and efficiently organized construction i(ndustry
wins all the civil works contracts, as is expected, the loan would corer
about $2.9 million of local costs. The financing plan is summarized i.n
Annex III. It is envisaged that the Government would finance about $9.5
million of the project costs initially with about $0.5 million being provided
by Suncheon City as equity capital for the city market. These estimat:es are
based on advanced preliminary engineering and early October 1974 costs;.
Physical and price contingencies, which together comprise about 29 perccent
of the total project cost (net of land acquisition), are considered adequate
as the implementation schedule is relatively short.
46. For the housing sites and services, the cities would borrow funds
from the Government (about 60 percent) and from the Korea Housing Banl; (KHB)
(about 40 percent) to cover expenditures for land acquisition, site p-eparation,
civil works, green areas, engineering and the construction of all infrastructure
and community facilities. The proceeds of the Bank loan used for housing
sites and services all of which would be channeled through the Govermaent,
would not be used for land acquisition. The cities would repay the axiounts owed
the Government over 25 years, including seven years of grace, at eight percent
per annum interest. The terms of the KIB loan would be for 15 years, including
three years of grace, at eight percent per annum. The Government wou:Ld
reimburse the cities for the costs of engineering services, off-site :Lnfrastructure,
community facilities, green areas and engineering by making appropriate payments
to the cities in accordance with the cities amortization schedules for the
Government and KHB loans. The city of Suncheon would repay the Govenlment
the funds spent on the city market over 25 years, including seven years of
grace, at eight percent interest per annum.
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47. The cost of land, site preparation and on-site infrastructure would
be recovered from site occupants in the sale price of the lots. The Government
would absorb the costs of off-site infrastructure, community facilities, green
areas and engineering. This financial arrangement implies that, of the total
cost of housing site preparation of $6.1 million equivalent, $3.4 million
(about 56 percent) would be recovered directly from site occupants. The
balance (about 44 percent) borne by the Government would be recovered
indirectly through general charges, taxes and fees. The road user and
electricity charges are sufficient for complete cost coverage but the water
and sewerage/drainage charges are low. Among the objectives of the technical
assistance included in the project is the determination of the actual capital
and operating costs of water supply in the four cities in order to provide
a sound basis for revised rates.
48. The cost of land, site preparation and on-site infrastructure only
would be recovered from the low and medium income site purchasers. The
purchasers of the lots for high income households would pay the market value
which is estimated to be at least 30 percent above the total of the cost
of land, site preparation and on-site infrastructure. Lots for 1893 houses
would be financed under the project as follows:
Average Estimated Cost to
Purchaser
Number ($ equivalent)
Lots for low-income2 1,365 1,523
households (116 m )
Lots for medium inc 2me 347 2,173
households (165 m )
Lots for high-incoml 181 3,960
households (231 m )
Total 1,893
49. A 20 percent down payment on 2lot purchases would be required from
low-income households buying the 116 m lots. This amount of down payment
is within the financial capacity of low-income families because they will
have been renting property prior to the purchase of lots under this project,
and renters normally pay a deposit equivalent to W70,000 per room
which is refunded, without interest, when the renter leaves. A 50 percen 
down payment would be required from middle-income households buying 165 m lots.
The repayment terms for the balance for low and medium income purchasers would
be 12 percent interest over 15 years (witn no grace period). The 12 percent
interest rate is higher than the present interest of 8 percent charged for
public housing, which would enable the cities to have a margin to cover
administrative expenses and any defaults. The Government is embarking on
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a major study of housing goals and policies, and the question of appropriate
interest rates for housing will receive particular attention in this study,
in the overall context of both resource mobilization and housing costs. The
231 m2 lots would be sold on a cash basis.
50. Housing construction in Korea tends to be relatively expensive
because of the heating systems, insulation and materials made necessary by
Korea's bitter winters. One of the objectives of the proposed project is to
develop ways to provide housing more cheaply. Changes in standards and
materials agreed with the Government for this project are expected to result
in less expensive houses than has been the case with recent Government
public housing projects. Also, some savings in site preparation are expected
although the high cost of land in Korea rules out substantial reductions.
Unit Costs (M
Land and site preparation $15.15 $13.14
Houses $60.61 $37.28 (with self-help)
$45.51 (fully con-
tractor built)
51. Financing for the cost of housing construction (not part of the
proposed Bank loan) for low- and middle-income site occupants would be made
available by the KHB through the cities. Purchasers can choose among a number
of designs and alternative floor plans which will permit varying amounts of
savings in construction costs to be realized through self-help labor. Up
to 80% of the housing construction cost would be financed and the repayment
terms would be 12 percent over 15 years. Initial debt service payments up
to 15 percent lower than those required under constant monthly payments would
be allowed although subsequent debt payments would increase over time to meet
the full amount of the purchasers' debt obligations. High-income households
(231 m2 lots) are expected to arrange their own financing for house con-
struction. For the housing sites, selection of purchasers would be made by
the Urban Project Units. Definitive criteria would be developed which would
include the following considerations: level of income, employment status,
family size, condition of present occupancy, and amount and source of down
payment. Preference would be given to families who do not presently own a
house and are working in commercial and industrial estates near the proposed
project sites. The cities have had experience with occupant selection under
the limited public housing undertaken and they will be assisted by the Korea
Housing Corporation which has been responsible for most public housing under-
taken in Korea.
52. In respect of the Suncheon city market, the city would assume an
obligation to pay the Government $0.74 million, the portion of the Bank loan
used to finance the market. The entire cost of the Suncheon city market
would be recovered from merchants through rentals and deposits. There would
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be monthly rentals for the buildings and the sheltered market, and daily
rentals for the open market. The deposits would be non-refundable but lease
rights would be transferable; stalls would be awarded to applicants giving
preference to merchants now renting in the old markets. In the case of the
Yeosu fishery harbor complex, the port management would collect revenues from
the sale of industrial sites and from the lease of port facilities. In addi-
tion, part of the port charges not required to meet the costs of operation
and maintenance will be credited to the Central Government. These, together
with the higher income tax receipts from the expanded activities, would be
sufficient to recover the capital investment in the port.
Disbursements
53. Disbursements from the proceeds of the proposed loan would be made
on the basis of:
(a) 100 percent of the cif cost of imported equipment plus
installation;
(b) 60 percent of total expenditures for civil works; and
(c) 60 percent of total expenditures for consultants services.
In order to start construction in the first quarter of 1975, detailed engineering
was begun during the latter half of 1974. It is recommended that retroactive
financing of up to $150,000 for detailed engineering and preparation of bidding
documents be financed from the loan.
Procurement
54. Contracts for civil works and for supply of equipment would be
awarded on the basis of international competitive bidding in accordance with
the Bank's guidelines. Civil works would be grouped to the extent possible
to encourage competitive bidding. Equipment, all of which is for the fishery
harbor complex, would be procured by the Office of Supply of the Republic of
Korea (OSROK), the Government's central procurement agency. OSROK would be
responsible for advertising requests for tenders, issuing tender documents,
evaluating bids and awarding contracts. A preference of up to 15% or the
applicable custom duties, whichever is lower, would be allowed bidders
offering locally manufactured goods.
Benefits and Justification
55. The primary objective of the proposed project is to develop the
institutional framework required to implement the Government's development
program for the Gwangju region. It also focuses on several high priority
investments identified in this program. The project would increase the
productive capacity of the region in many ways: facilities and technical
assistance would be provided for expanded fishery activities and fish pro-
cessing, for transportation, for trading of agricultural and industrial
- 17 -
products, and for housing services. Within the four participating cities,
the project would not only provide institutional support and certain critical
infrastructure but would also help the cities achieve a more desirable and
efficient spatial growth pattern in the future. The project would support
the cities in their crucial roles as centers for many of the industrial,
commercial and service activities that are vital to the successful
implementation of the overall regional development program.
56. The housing sites and services component of the project focuses on
a sector where new and more vigorous approaches are required. It complements
efforts toward the formulation of a national housing policy and the imple-
mentation of a housing program. The stress on low-cost housing construction
techniques and careful monitoring and evaluation of the project should
provide the experience required for further cost reduction during later site
development stages not only in the four secondary cities but also elsewhere
in Korea.
57. The economic rate of return for the Project as a whole is estimated
at about 28 percent. For the individual cities and project components, the
estimated economic rates of return are:
Percentage




Fishery harbor complex - Yeosu 33




A detailed survey of the value of housing services carried out in the four
cities in December 1973 formed the basis of the assessment of benefits for
the housing sites and services components of the project. For the Yeosu
fishery harbor complex, benefits were quantified on the basis of forecasts
of sales of industrial sites at market value, on time and fuel savings for the
existing fishing fleet, on the increased catch of fish by an expanded fishing
fleet and on the earnings of various port facilities. A survey of demand for
market space and existing stall rents was used in the calculation of the
return from the Suncheon city market, and the benefits from the access roads
were determined by comparing vehicle operating costs and passenger travel
times with and without the roads.
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58. During the Project implementation period, 2000 full-time construction
jobs would be created; an additional 600 jobs would be added for two and a
half years for housing construction on sites prepared under the Project. In
the long term, 5000 jobs (mostly related to the fishery harbor complex and
the Suncheon market) would be created.
59. The Project would prepare the way for improved regional planning
and regional development by providing technical assistance to the national
office concerned with regional planning. Also, the GRDU which would supervise
implementation of this project would be a model that could be followed for
supervising and coordinating development projects in other regions in Korea.
Consultants' services would provide technical assistance in the operation
and management of the water supply systems in the four cities. The proposed
feasibility studies of selected projects under the UNDP Phase II Study would
prepare future regional investment possibilities.
PART V - LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND AUTHORITY
60. The draft Loan Agreement between the Bank and the Republic of Korea,
the report of the Committee provided for in Article III, Section 4 (iii) of
the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and the text of a draft resolution
approving the proposed Loan Agreement follows the pattern of Bank Agreements
for loans of this kind.
61. 1 am satisfied that the proposed Loan would comply with the Articles
of Agreement of the Bank.
PART VI - RECOMMENDATION
62. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed Loan.
Robert S. McNamara
President
by J. Burke Knapp
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SECONDARY CITIES REGIONAL PROJECT
THE STATUS OF BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
A. Statement of Bank Loans and IDA Credits (as at October 31, 1974)
Loan or US$ million
Credit Amount (less cancellations)
Number Year Borrower Purpose Bank IDA Undisbursed
Five loans and credits fully disbursed 24.7 39.7
600 1969 ADC Irrigation 45.0 13.5
151 1969 Republic of Education 14.8 4.2
Korea
669 1970 Republic of Railways 40.0 3.1
Korea
234 1971 Republic of Livestock 7.0 .5
Korea
735 1971 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 30.0 2.2
769 1971 Republic of Highways 54.5 1.5
Korea
283 1972 Republic of Irrigation 15.0 9.5
Korea
795 1972 ADC Irrigation 33.0 32.4
335 1972 Republic of Agricultural Cr. 10.5 6.3
Korea
863 1972 Republic of Railways 40.0 29.6
Korea
905 1973 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 40.0 18.2
906 
394 1973. Republic of Education II 23.0 20.0 42.9
Korea
917 1973 Republic of Ports 80.0 78.2
Korea
942 1973 Republic of Seeds Produc- 7.0 6.9
Korea tion
953 1974 Republic of Tourism 25.0 25.0
Korea
956 1974 Republic of Highways II 47.0 38.8
Korea
994 - 1974 AFDC Agriculture 13.0 13.0
Total 502.2 107.0 325.8
of which has been repaid 10.1 0.3
Total now outstanding 492.1 106.7
Amount sold 2.0
of which has been repaid 0.8 1.5
Total now held by Bank and
IDA (prior to exchange adjustment) 490.9 106.7
Total undisbursed 285.4 40.4 325.8
La Not yet effective.
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B. Projects in Execution
Loan Jo. 600 Pyongtaek-Kumgang irrigation Project; US$45.0 million
Loan of May 23, 1969; Closing Date: June 30, 1975
This is the first major irrigation project constructed in Korea.
It was expected at appraisal that it would irrigate about 35,000 ha. of
land, improve drainage and roads, consolidate paddy fields, bench upland
and reclaim tidal land. The start of construction was postponed by a major
reorganization of the executing agency and a delay in hiring consultants.
The major project elements (two sea dikes, the main distribution system
and pumping plants) are expected to be largely completed by the end of 1974.
Contracts for most of the remaining work have been awarded. Some 5,000
na. of the area to be irrigated by the project have been deleted because
of cost considerations. Overall project costs have risen from US$90 million
to about US$130 million mainly because of the increased costs of right-of-way,
engineering, administration and land consolidation. Preliminary estimates
indicate increases in the price of rice will partially offset the effects
of higher costs and reduced irrigable area. Nevertheless, the overall rate
of economic return of the project will likely be about 10 percent, compared
with 14 percent estimated during appraisal. The implementing agency (ADC)
is reviewing ways of reducing costs on tne remaining work which should lead
to some marginal cost savings. About 70 percent of the loan has been
disbursed. Construction is progressing satisfactorily and all work is
scheduled for completion by mid-1976. An extension of the present Closing
Date will be necessary.
Credit No. 151 First Education Project; US$14.8 million Credit of
June 4, 1969; Closing Date: December 31, 1974
This Project comprises: (a) the expansion and equipping of 27
technical, commercial and agricultural nigh schools, 5 post-secondary higher
schools and 4 university teacher training departments; and (b) 26 man-years
of tecnnical assistance and 20 man-years of overseas fellowships to support
tne development of agricultural and technical education.
Project implementation is about 12 montns behind schedule because,
in the initial stages, delays occured in the establishment of tne Project
Units, the selection and appointment of consultant architects and the for-
mulation of equipment procurement procedures. The Project is now progressing
satisfactorily, but it is expected that because of the initial delays it will
be completed later than estimated at appraisal. This will require a post-
ponement of the Closing Date by about a year.
1/ These notes are designed to inform the Executive Directors regarding the
progress of projects in execution, and in particular to report any problems
which are being encountered, and the action being taken to remedy them.
They should be read in this sense, and with the understanding that they




Loan 669 Third Railway Project; US$40.0 million loan and
Credit No. 183 US$15.0 million Credit of May 14, 1970; Closing Date:
December 31, 1975
The bulk of the Loan and Credit was earmarked for the purchase of
freight cars, diesel locomotives, and telecommunications and track maintenance
equipment. Delays in the procurement of some microwave equipment and a
special purpose car, the last items to be purchased under the Project, have
caused the Closing Date of the Loan to be postponed from August 31, 1973 to
December 31, 1975.
Credit No. 234 Integrated Dairy Beef Development Project; US$7.0 million
Credit of February 11, 1971; Closing Date: March 31, 1977
The development of about 700 small and medium-sized dairy farms by
providing long-term loans, and the construction and operation of two dairy
products processing plants are the principal components of the Project which.
also includes management and technical services related to these activities.
The Project is progressing satisfactorily. To date, about 328 farmers have
participated and farm loans of about US$3.3 million equivalent have been
approved. About 3,500 head of cattle have been purchased and two diary plants
have been constructed and are in operation. Problems in the Government's
pasture maintenance and artificial insemination services and a shortage of
fertilizers and concentrate feeds of adequate quality continue but they are
to some extent being offset by the excellent technical services being provided
under the Project. Loan funds, except for technical services, will be fully
committed by the end of 1974. The proposed second livestock project would
be executed by the same agency, the Korea Dairy Beef Company.
Loan No. 735 Third Korea Development Finance Company Project, US$30
million Loan of May 14, 1971; Closing Date: August 31,
1975
The Project is progressing satisfactorily. The Loan is fully
committed.
Loan No. 769 First Highway Project; US$54.5 million Loan of June 29,
1971; Closing Date: November 30, 1975
The construction of approximately 370 km of national highways
between Jeonju and Busan was satisfactorily completed in December 1973, at
a final cost about 5 percent above the appraisal estimate. Tne feasibility
studies have been completed for 1,400 km of national highways, and detailed
engineering of 900 km is in progress. A nighway maintenance study is also
being undertaken and a new National Highway Maintenance Organization has
been established on a pilot basis in one of the Provinces.
rNyEX II
Page 4
Loan No. 795 Yong San Gang Irrigation Project; US$33.J miAllton Loan
Credit No. 283 and US$15.0 million Credit of February 2, 197Z; Closing
Date: September 30, 1977
Tnis is the second major irrigation project financed by the Bank
in Korea. It aims at transforming an area with the highest drought fre-
quency in Korea into one with year-round irrigation and crop diversification.
Also, there will be increased production of high value crops such as fruits
and winter vegetables to take advantage of the relatively favorable climate
in the project area. Detailed survey and design work is proceeding satis-
factorily and construction has begun on three of the four dams. Award of
the remaining three major contracts for canals and land consolidation will
be delayed until next summer, with construction to start after rice harvest,
which is about a year later that estimated at appraisal. The delay was caused
mainly by financial difficulties attributed to price escalation and design
modifications. Cost estimates (including $58 million for price increases
beyond 1974) have increased by about 106 percent mainly because of inflation,
but modifications in dam design, and increases in the number of structures
and quantities have also been significant. The increased cost will be largely
offset by nigher prices for rice and an increase of about 1,400 ha. in the
net area to be irrigated.
Credit No. 335 Agricultural Credit Project; US$10.5 million Credit of
September 29, 1972; Closing Date: September 1, 1976
The Credit supports a three year lending program to small farmers
to develop orchards and sericulture and to encourage poultry and swine pro-
duction. Project implementation has improved substantially in recent months
because of improvements in the appraisal of sub-projects brought about by
intensive training of Kun Cooperative loan officers and close supervision
by the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation's Project Unit. The
Project is now progressing satisfactorily.
Loan No. 863 Fourth Railway Project; US$40.0 million Loan of
November 22, 1972; Closing Date: December 31, 1976
The main elements of the Project are: electrification of lines in
the Seoul suburban area; purchase of electric railcars and locomotives; the
completion of electrification of 350 km of line running from Seoul to the
northeastern part of Korea; track and bridge renewal; provision of yard
facilities; acquisition of passenger and freight cars; and improvement of
facilities for the maintenance and repair of motive power and rolling stock.
About 70 percent of Loan funds have been committed.
Loan No. 905 Fourth KDFC Project; US$40.0 million Loan of June 13,
1973; Closing Date: December 31, 1977




Loan No. 906 Second Education Project; US$23.0 millionl Loan and
Credit No. 394 US$20.0 million of Credit of June 13, 1973; Clos-ing
Date: December 31, 1977
The Project provides equipment for: 18 technical and 14 agricultural
high schools; 10 higher schools/junior colleges for industrial, agri.cultural,
fishery and nursing training; colleges of agriculture, engineering aind
natural sciences in ten universities and a merchant marine college; 10 junior
teacher colleges and 12 colleges of education. It also includes pre-investment
studies on health and management education and staff development. ibis Loan,
which was declared effective on September 10, 1973 is about six months behind
appraisal estimates because of delays in the selection of consultant: architects,
the commencement of designs for civil works and the preparation of equipment
lists.
Loan No. 917 Ports_Project_ USS80 million Loan of June 27, 1(E73;
Tne Project includes the provision of container and bulk cargo
facilities and equipment at Busan and coal piers and handling equipment at
Busan and Mfukho. Consultants contracts have been let for technical assistance
to the proposed Korea Port Authority and a Phase II Port Development: Study.
Contracts for dredging and construction of the composite pier and pier 7 at
Busan have been awarded. Design and preparation of tender documents for the
remaining project items are proceeding satisfactorily. Revised cost: estimates
show an increase of about 46 percent over appraisal estimates, much of which
is increased contingencies for future years.
Loan No. 942 Seeds Project; US$7.0 million Lomn of November '5,
1973; Closing Date: December 31, 1978
The Project consists of: (a) the installationi of five field crop
seed processing and storage facilities; (b) farm machinery for seed production;
(c) a revolving fund for procuring seasonal seed inventories; (d) seed testing
laboratories and equipment; (e) crop research (financed in part by USAID);
(f) feasibility studies for irrigation and area development; and (g) technical
assistance. The Loan was declared effective on April 24, 1974.
Loan No. 953 Kyongju Tourism Project; US$25.0 million Loan of:
January 4, 1974; Closing Date: December 31, 19'8
The Project forms part of the first phase of the planned develop-
ment of the Bomun Lake resort near Kyongju. It provides for a multi-
purpose dam; an irrigation system for about 1,200 ha; improvement ot the
water supply and sewerage systems for the project area; installation of
telephone, telegraph and telex facilities in the project area; the construction
and/or realignment of about 57 kms of roads; infrastructure includilng storm
water drainage, environmental sanitation, community facilities, a golf course,
a school for training hotel personnel; and a feasibility study for t:he develop-
ment of tourism on Cleju Island. The Loan was declared effective on May 6, 1974.
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Final design for almost all Project components is complete and the first two
contracts have been awarded. Because of recent unexpectedly large increases
in prices, rephasing of the Project is being considered to make effective
use of Project funds.
Loan No. 956 Second Highway Project; US$47.0 million Loan of
Janurary 25, 1974; Closing Date: December 31, 197.
The Project, which forms part of the Government's 1972-76 road
construction and paving program, consists of the construction, chiefly on new
alignments, of about 130 kms of highways; feasibility studies by consultants
of about 1,000 kms of national and provincial roads, followed by detailed
engineering where justified; and the procurement of highway maintenance and
workshop equipment for the extension of a new highway maintenance program from
a pilot province to the remainder of the country. The Loan was declared
effective on April 4, 1974. All construction and paving contracts have been
awarded; implementation of the Project is progressing satisfactorily.
Loan No. 994 Integrated Agricultural Products Processing Project;
US$13.0 million Loan of June 7, 1974; Closing Date:
June 30, 1979
The Project will integrate the on-farm production of asparagus, oak
mushrooms, mushrooms, spinach, peaches and strawberries with efficient hygienic
processing facilities using land that is presently idle or underutilized.
About 435 ha. of asparagus, 2,500 ha. of spinach, 300 ha. of strawberry and
oak mushrooms on about 24,000 m3 of oak logs will be developed. Four canneries
will be expanded and 22 canneries will be modernized. Two new freezing plants
will be constructed, one will be modernized and up to seven oak mushroom
drying facilities will be constructed. The terminal date for effectiveness
of the Project has been extended to January 15, 1975, to provide additional




SECONDARY CITIES REGIONAL PROJECT
LOAN AND PROJECT SUMMARY
borrower: The Republic of Korea
Amount: US$15.0 million
Terms: Twenty-five years, including seven years of
grace, at 8 percent.
Project Description:
The proposed project would consist of:
(a) Infrastructure including:
(i) Hlousing sites and services in the cities
of Yeosu, Mogpo and Gwangju (370,384 m2 );
(ii) A fishery harbor complex with indus-
trial processing zone (215,385 m2) in
Yeosu;
(iii) A city market in Suncheon City (33,166 m2);
and
(iv) Access roads in Yeosu and Mogpo (6.61 km).
(b) Technical Assistance:
(i) To assist the establishment and opera-
tion of the Gwangju Regional Develop-
ment Unit at the Provincial level and
to strengthen regional planning at the
national level;
(ii) To provide advisory assistance for the




(iii) To develop a program of tecIinici1 assistance
to assist in the operation and management of
water supply systems in the four cities, in-
cluding the identification of short-term
improvement; and
(iv) To carry out feasibility studies of selected
projects to be identified by the UNDP Phase








Local Foreign Total Component-
(US$ million)
Project Component
A. diousing Sites and
Services 2.7 1.8 4.5 51
d. Yeosu Fishiery
Harbor Complex 4.2 4.3 8.5 52
C. Suncheon City
dlarket 0.4 U.4 0.8 48
















Assistance 0.2 0.2 0.4 55
(iv) Feasibility
Studies 0.3 0.2 0.5 45
F. Contingencies
(i) Physical
(14;%) 1.0 1.1 2.1 52
(ii) Price
(23%2) 2.2 2.4 4.6 51
fotal 12.9 12.1 25.0 48





Project Component Government Suncneon Bank Loan Total Cost
dousing Sites and Services 4.0 - 2.1 6.1
Yeosu Fishery Harbor Complex 2.9 - 9.3 12.2
Sunchieon City ilarket - 0.5 0.7 1.2
Access Roads 1.9 - 1.9 3.8
Sub-Total 8.8 U.5 14.0 23.3
Technical Assistance 0.7 - 1.0 1.7
T'otal 9.5 0.5 15.0 25.0
Estimated Disbursements:






Procurement Arrangements: Contracts for civil works and equipment would be
awarded on the basis of international competitive
bidding in accordance with the bank's Guidelines
for Procurement. A preference of up to 15
percent or the applicable customs duties,
whichever is lower, would be applied to bidders
offering locally manufactured goods.
Techinical Assistance: See (b) under project description above.
Rate of Return: The economic rate of return for the project as
a whole is estimated to be of the order of 28
percent.
Appraisal d~eport: 546-KO dated December 6, 1974.
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